Should The T Keep a Commuter Subsidy?

In order to close next year’s budget gap, Boston’s MBTA transit system is planning to raise fares and cut service. This will be the first time since 2007 fares have been changed.

A detailed analysis released by the Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS) last week considered two scenarios with sharp increases. (The report, along with other materials and a listing of planned public meetings is available at http://mbta.com/jointhediscussion) This analysis includes the specific bus routes considered for elimination, a topic I won’t discuss here but one which deserves close scrutiny.

Under Scenario 1, which contains fewer service cuts, the regular Charliecard fare would increase from $1.70 to $2.40 (paying by cash would be slightly more expensive, as now). Under Scenario 2, with more service cuts, the fare would increase only to $2.25. Although large increases in percentage terms, these fares are reasonable when compared with other major U.S. subway systems. The combination of fare increases and service cuts will help the agency keep pace with the agency’s skyrocketing costs of employee health insurance, energy, and system maintenance. Of course, additional revenues from the state government is always a possibility.

However a large number of riders don’t pay the cash fare. Instead, they purchase the unlimited local bus and subway “LinkPass” that was introduced in 2007. The price of this pass will increase also, from $59 per monthly currently to $80 for Scenario 1 and $78 in Scenario 2. The overall logic of the fare structure was only subtly modified, and CTPS notes in their study that “the cash-fare equivalent would decrease or remain virtually the same in both scenarios” for all types of passes — including the LinkPass.

The cost of the current pass is worth about 34.7 single trips on local buses or subway lines. Since the typical month has about 20 work days (40 trips), taking into account a few weeks of vacation, holidays, and personal days, averaging about 34.7 trips per month seems like a reasonable point to incentivize buying a pass for most riders. Put it other terms, current pass holders pay about 87% of the full cash fare for a month of commuting (40 trips). This would stay the same for Scenario 2, but drop to 83% for Scenario 1.

There’s only one problem with this analysis — LinkPass riders use their passes much more than that. With the introduction of the new fares in 2007 the MBTA introduced an “Automated Fare Collection” system, which means raw data about ridership patterns are available. In an analysis I completed last spring with CTSP-provided data, I found that in that year each LinkPass sold resulted in 52.13 subway trips and 12.79 bus trips per month that year. This means the effective price per trip is significantly lower than the “regular” cash fares. The average rider is getting a $26.62 discount per month on the subway alone, paying roughly $1.13 per trip. Of course, many are paying much less — or much more.

Having such a low-cost unlimited pass is unusual. Washington, D.C.’s system charges time- and distance-based fares for each trip, only offering limited passes. New York City’s pass is $104, and Atlanta’s is $95.

Of course, such an inexpensive monthly pass can be justified on several grounds. It could be interpreted as a liberal concession to the city’s large transit-dependent population. However if it is, it is an inefficient one indeed, since LinkPasses are also owned by a large number of well paid professionals. Political logic may also suggest avoiding a detailed analysis of the complete fare structure. Perhaps an across-the-board increase is conceptually simpler to discuss in the 20 public meetings that are planned. However, since increases happen so infrequently and the trouble of 20 public meetings are planned, shouldn’t all aspects of the system’s fares and operations be up for negotiation?

This issue is only one that will be discussed in the coming months. Others include which routes should be changed or eliminated, what additional reforms are possible to reduce the MBTA’s expenses, and what other sources of revenue are possible including a plan for more regular fare increases. Hopefully the process will result in a plan to put the MBTA on a more sustainable financial footing, with sensible trade-offs among the multiple public objectives involved.

More resources:
> See my previous post “Raising Fares on Boston’s Subway for Safety and Reliability”
> See supplementary information at www.mbta.com/jointhediscussion

Why the T is Broke

The Boston MBTA, the city’s public transportation agency which operates public ferries, buses, the subway, and commuter trains, is broke. The agency’s budget for last year was patched by a one-time payment of $160 million funded by a state sales tax increase, and the agency has over $8.5 billion dollars in outstanding debt. In addition, the system is falling into disrepair. The agency estimates they’d have to spend over $3 billion just to bring the subway up to a “state of good repair.” In FY 2010, $543 million in safety-critical maintenance projects were not funded.

Of course, transit watchers know despite record ridership in recent years, two other of the nation’s other large, old transit systems are in equally dire straights — Chicago and New York. Although some of the problems are similar, I wanted to know the causes of the crisis in Boston. A recent report by a gubernatorial-appointed commission laid out the stark facts. The report, completed by a group headed by former finance industry executive David F. D’Alessandro, was published in November. This post relies largely on this recent report, readers with alternative perspectives are welcome to post comments below.

In 1999, the Massachusetts state legislature dedicated 20% of the State’s sales tax collection, excluding meals taxes, to the MBTA. Starting in July 1, 2000 this “forward funding” plan meant the MBTA would have a regular revenue source going forward. The agency adopted a financial plan for a balanced budget for the years 2001 through 2008. In the words of the report, “The Forward Funding Finance Plan proved unrealistic in many of its assumptions and nine years later can be deemed a failure.” The authors conclude the main driver of why the plan failed was “unavoidable cost explosions.”

• Fuel and utilities: cost $256 million more than anticipated due to increasing energy costs for the agency’s vehicles. The agency buys huge amounts of fuel and electricity for buses and trains.
• Payroll and employee benefits: $113 million more than anticipated. Wage increases were comparable to the 3.5% rate of inflation, but health care costs increased by 73%.
• The Ride (a federally mandated door-to-door paratransit service for disabled riders): $95 million more than planned.
• Sales tax revenue: $150 million less than expected. The forward funding plan projected an annual growth of 3%, it has actually only increased at around 1%

The only categories where there was good news was Commuter Rail ($37 million under budget) and nontax revenues were $95 million higher than expected. The report concludes the additional revenue is the result of three fare increases, the report authors observer “the last (2007) fare hike actually exceeded the Plan’s target, in part because ridership grew despite the fare hike.”

The cumulative total across the eight years? A $558 million deficit. The report concludes, “A private sector firm faced with this mountain of red ink would likely fold or seek bankruptcy.” In short, to keep operating the agency balanced their budget by pushing off debt, restructuring $238 million in the last three years alone. They also neglected maintenance. Among 56 maintenance projects with a “10″ — the highest — on an internal safety rating, only 6 were funded last year. The authors conclude the agency tool other steps to control costs:

Contrary to not trying, we found evidence that the MBTA did make some hard expense choices. Across-the-board cuts were routinely made to departmental budgets. Periodic layoffs and hiring freezes restrained the headcount. Individual managers took pride in eliminating inefficiencies and redundancies, while embracing a new organizational ethic of customer service. Yet in the end, they could not pare staff below the number needed to move hundreds of thousands of riders across hundreds of routes each workday. Add the complexity and cost of sustaining the system’s aging infrastructure, and it became evident that the cost inflation and savings assumptions in the Finance Plan were never tested against the daily grind.

Against such a bleak picture, finding a “solution” seems like an insurmountable task. However, if any urban institution is “too important to fail” it’s the MBTA. I haven’t done a financial analysis, but the list below presents some steps that could be taken to improve the agency’s solvency.

1. Higher Fares, Pegged to Inflation
There are two general philosophies related to transit fares. One is to support transit from sales taxes or other general taxes, and keep fares low. (Transit as a public good) The other is to use fares to cover a much higher proportion of the actual cost of running the agency. (Transit as a private good) Massachusetts, like most places, has taken the first approach. However, as we have seen, this introduces problems with general tax revenues increase too slowely, and it restricts the agency’s ability to adjust fares to cover the increasing real costs of the inputs to transit (worker benefits, electricity, etc). I’ve struggled with this issue, and concluded I think fares should be increased, and at the very least pegged to inflation. In order to mitigate the equity effects, special subsidies could be implemented for low-income riders. Although I believe in the principle of transit as a public good, Americans generally don’t support the level of taxation to support high quality transit. Using fares for a larger proportion of revenue also means increasing ridership will increase revenues. (By raising the cost of transportation it can also have interesting land-use effects – something for another post.)

2. Debt Relief
The agency needs a large, one-time injection to pay off its sizable debt, some of which was “given” to the agency as part of the costs of the Big Dig. Paying it off now will save taxpayers money in the long run.

3. Federal Funds for Maintenance and Capital Costs
Lots of interests are already lining up for funding from the federal government’s next transportation bill. It should contain a revenue source for transportation infrastructure maintenance and improvement that can be used by agencies like the MBTA. The MBTA Review report describes how a huge proportion of the agency’s rolling stock of buses and trains will need to be upgraded or replaced in the coming years, with no funds in sight to pay for it.

4. Greater Rider Awareness
As I ride the T daily, I often wonder whether the other riders know about the agency’s shaky finances and massive maintenance backlog. I suspect most take the system for granted. Transit advocates — and perhaps the agency itself — should explain in clear terms why the numbers aren’t adding up. This work is as necessary as the others to create the political will for painful, long term solutions. Doing nothing means the discussion about solution will occur in response to a crisis such as an accident or strike. Crises can produce quick fixes, but rarely the type of long-term solutions that are needed.

How do you think the MBTA’s finances can be improved?

> MBTA Review Report (November 2009)
> U.S. PIRG Report – Derailed by Debt (October 2007)

Transit Apps, Visualizations, Data Plans Announced

Today I attended the MassDOT Developers Conference on transportation apps and data. The conference was organized by Chris Dempsey and Josh Robin, two Massachusetts state employees who have been spearheading work to publish transportation data and encourage third party developers to create apps in the state.

The big news at the conference was their announcement of a pilot project to provide real-time bus arrival data for several MBTA bus lines. They also announced the winners of competitions for apps and visualizations that used the published data. In addition to scheduling and spatial data, the data for the visualization competition included two datasets containing the time, method of payment, and location (bus route or subway station) for every rider payment for two days.

The winning applications were two iPhone apps containing schedule data. The winning visualization was this animation showing activity in the transit network. The runner-up, “A Day In the Life of the MBTA,” featured striking visualizations of the data showing activity patterns at different stations throughout the days. I also appreciated another entrant, “A Day of MBTA” who created a website with histograms for riders entering each T station.

During his talk, the NextBus’s Michael Smith observed RFID payment cards such as the CharlieCard can improve the bus riding experience by speeding passenger boarding. Riders of busy bus lines know how much one or two riders paying with cash can slow down the system. Although the visualization contest data included payment data, none of the entrants analyzed it. According to the key the state provided, the various payment types are:

• MBTA Old Tickets – This refers to magnetic tickets that are pre-encoded by a third party vendor and then distributed to T sales offices for sale to the general public. They are also distributed to Cubic, which is the vendor in charge of completing on-line and Corporate Program orders.
• Triplex Roll mag. Stripe (Large and Small) – This is the type of stock used to encode magnetic tickets that are issued from Fare Vending Machines and bus Fareboxes.
• PreCut Triplex w. mag. Stripe – This is the type of stock used to encode magnetic tickets that are issued for bulk production of magnetic tickets and retail sales terminals at 7-Eleven, Stop and Shop, etc.
• Smart Card Mifare 1k – This is the type of media on which Charlie Cards and IDs are issued.
• Regular Charlie Cards are purchased pre-encoded from a third party vendor and then distributed to subway stations, select bus terminals, T sales offices and retail locations for further distribution to the general public. Student Charlie Cards and IDs are issued from back-office devices located at 10 Park Plaza.

Using the data key provided, I created summary statistics for payment methods by bus route:

The result seems to show relatively high usage rates on most bus lines. The busy 1 bus, running from Cambridge to Dudley Square, had 77% riders paying with CharlieCards on September 8. I don’t know enough about the routes to pull out any other findings — but there are some curious patterns. (Why does the 429 have 32% paying with “other,” presumably cash?)

CharlieCard use on the subway is also high, ranging from 58% on the Silver Line to 72% on the Red Line. At the station level, the stations with the highest CharlieCard use rates are Wollaston, Davis Square, and Bowdoin, all at over 80%.

Do any readers see interesting patterns in the CharlieCard data? Did anyone else attend?

Notes and other materials will be posted on the following websites next week:

> MassDOT Developers Page
> MassDOT Developers Conference Website